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Assuming that capital productivity is higher in areas at 
risk from natural hazards (such as coastal zones or flood 
plains), this paper shows that rapid development in these 
areas—and the resulting increase in disaster losses—may 
be the consequence of a rational and well-informed trade-
off between lower disaster losses and higher productivity. 
With disasters possibly becoming less frequent but 
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increasingly destructive in the future, average disaster 
losses may grow faster than wealth. Myopic expectations, 
lack of information, moral hazard, and externalities 
reinforce the likelihood of this scenario. These results 
have consequences on how to design risk management 
and climate change policies. 1
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1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that economic losses due to natural disasters have been increas-
ing exponentially in the last decades. The main drivers of this trend are the increase in
population, and the growth in wealth per capita. With more and richer people, it is not
surprising to ﬁnd an increase in disaster losses. More surprising is the fact that, in spite of
growing investments in risk reduction, the growth in losses has been as fast as economic
growth(e.g., for ﬂoods in Europe, see Barredo, 2009; at the global scale, with much larger
uncertainties, see Miller et al., 2008, Neumayer and Barthel, 2010), or even faster than
economic growth (e.g., in the U.S. and for hurricanes, see Nordhaus, 2010; Pielke et al.,
2008; at the global scale, Bouwer et al., 2007). Anthropogenic climate change does not
seem to play a signiﬁcant role in these evolutions, except possibly in very speciﬁc cases,
for some hazards in some regions (Schmidt et al., 2009; Neumayer and Barthel, 2010;
Bouwer, 2011). In the U.S., the trend in hurricane losses relative to wealth can be almost
completely explained by the fact that people take more and more risks, by moving and
investing more and more in at-risk areas (Pielke et al., 2008).
Most of the time, the explanations offered for this increasingly risk-taking trend are
the following:
• Information and transaction costs: since the information on natural hazards and risk
is not always easily available, households and businesses may decide not to spend
the time, money and effort to collect them, and disregard this information in their
decision-making process (Magat et al., 1987; Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989; and
Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1995).
• Externalities, moral hazards, and market failures: since insurance and post-disaster
support are often available in developed countries, households and ﬁrms in risky
areas do not pay the full cost of the risk, and may take more risk than what is
socially optimal (e.g., Kaplow, 1991; Burby et al., 1991; Laffont, 1995). Also, Lall
and Deichmann (2010) show that risk mitigation has positive externalities and that
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private and social costs of disaster losses may differ, leading to inappropriate risk
reducing investments.
• Irrational behaviors and biased risk perceptions: Individuals do not always react
rationally when confronted to small probability risks, and they defer choosing be-
tween ambiguous choices (Tversky and Shaﬁr 1992; Trope and Lieberman, 2003).
Moreover, they have trouble to take into account events that have never occurred
before (the “bias of imaginability”, see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Finally,
private and public investment decisions do not always adequately take long and
very long-term consequences intoaccount (for public decisions, see Michel-Kerjan,
2008; for private decisions, see Kunreuther et al. 1978, and Thaler, 1999).
There is no doubt these factors play a key role. But this move toward at-risk areas
could also be a rational decision — motivated by higher productivity in at-risk areas
— rather than a market failure. Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008) suggested that rational
decisions could explain non-monotonic trends in disaster deaths. This paper shows that
they may also lead to increasing economic losses.
Many investments have higher productivity in at-risk areas than in risk-free zones,
and bring beneﬁts that justify increased levels of risk.2 As suggested by Bouwer (2011),
this is particularly true for areas at risk from ﬂoods and coastal storms. For instance,
international harbors and tourism create jobs and activities that attract workers in coastal
zones inspite of ﬂoodrisks. When economicgrowthisdrivenbyexport, the attractiveness
of coastal zones is reinforced because these regions allow for easier and cheaper exports.
In China, for instance, Fleisher et Chen (1997) ﬁnd that Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
is 85 percent higher in coastal regions than in inland region, and that TFP growth rates
are not signiﬁcantly different in spite of higher investment in inland regions, suggesting
a permanent productivity advantage in coastal regions. Also, cheap waterway transport
attracts industrial production close to ﬂood plains, and partly explains why most large
cities are located on rivers.
From the activities that beneﬁt from being located in a risk-prone area, such as coastal
zones, additional investments are then carried out to beneﬁt from agglomeration exter-
nalities on productivity and reduced transportation costs (Ciccone et al., 1996; Ciccone,
2002; World Bank, 2008; Lall and Deichmann, 2010). Gallup et al. (1998) analyze the
impact of geography and transportation costs on productivity and growth, and ﬁnd that
areas with lower transportation costs are more productive; these areas are also often more
at risk from ﬂoods, because they are on the coast or next to rivers. As an illustration,
landlocked countries have higher transportation costs (measured by the shipping costs),
2Productivity is considered here in a broad sense. For instance, the amenities provided by the proximity
to water (e.g., near the Floridian beaches) can be considered as a higher productivityfrom housing services
and leisure activity.3
and had over the 1965-1990 period a growth rate on average 1 percent lower than coastal
countries, which are at risk from coastal ﬂoods and storms.
Also, the drivers of economic growth are concentrated in cities, and productivity and
productivity growth is larger in cities (World Bank, 2008). Reviewing evidence from
eight developing countries, Fields (1975) reports per capita income in urban areas from
two to eight times larger than in rural areas. Lu (2002) shows that in China from 1990 to
1999, the urban-rural per capita consumption ratio lies between 1.5 and 5. At the global
scale, World Bank (2008) reports urban-rural income ratios between 1.5 for developed
countries and up to 3 for developing countries, suggesting much higher productivity in
cities at all stages of development. Differences are also large for consumption, with urban
consumption premiums (compared with rural consumption) that are always positive and
frequently exceed 50 percent. Not only is productivity and consumption higher in urban
areas, but amenities are also often superior: among low-income countries with urban
population shares of less than 25 percent, access to water and sanitation in towns and
cities is around 25 percentage points higher than in rural areas (World Bank, 2008). These
differences create strong incentives for rapid rural-urban migration. Confronted with land
scarcity and high land costs in large cities, this migration has led to construction in at-risk
areas (e.g., Burby et al., 2001; Burby et al., 2006; Lall and Deichmann, 2010). In the most
marginal and risky locations, informal settlements and slums are often present, putting a
poor and vulnerable population in a situation of extreme risk (e.g., Ranger et al., 2011).
One can make the case, therefore, that populationand asset migrationsto at-risk areas,
and the resulting increase in disaster losses, are not solely due to lack of information,
irrational behaviors and moral hazard, as often suggested, but also to a rational trade-off
between lower disaster losses and higher productivity in risky areas (as suggested in their
analysis of disaster deaths by Kellenberg and Mobarak, 2008).
Compared with previous investigations of trends in disaster economic losses (e.g.,
Lewis and Nickerson, 1989; Schumacher and Strobl, 2008), this analysis stresses the
existence of beneﬁts from investing in at-risk areas, investigates both investments in at-
risk locations and risk mitigation choices in a common framework, and highlights the
trade-off between lower disaster losses and higher productivity.
Within this framework and under some conditions, it is found that — even with no
change in climate conditions and hazard characteristics — natural disasters may become
more destructive in the future and that average losses may increase faster than wealth
and income. This increase would arise from an intuitive mechanism: economic growth
leads to better protections against natural disasters, which in turns make it rational to
invest more in at-risk areas, worsening the consequences when disasters occur in spite of
protections. If the worsening of disaster consequences dominates the decrease in disaster
probability, average losses can increase, and they can do so faster than income and wealth
growth.4
This possibility has important consequences on how to design risk management and
risk reduction policies and how to deal with climate change. These aspects are discussed
in the conclusion, which can be read independently of the more technical ﬁrst sections of
this paper.
2 Larger disasters in a wealthier world?
It is generally accepted that richer populations invest more to protect themselves from
natural hazards. A richer population, however, may also invest more in at-risk areas,
increasing exposure to natural hazards. These two trends have opposite impacts on risk,
and the resulting trend in risk is thus ambiguous. This trend is investigated in this section
with a simple model.
2.1 A balanced growth pathway
Let us assume a balanced economy, in which economic production is done using produc-




The variable Yb is annual production (i.e. value added) in the balanced growth path-
way; Kb is the corresponding amount of productive capital; and ψ is total productivity.
All variables are time dependent, and are assumed to grow over time. Productivity is
growing at a rate λ.
ψ(t)=ψ(0)e
λt (2)
Assuming the economy is on a balanced growth pathway, production and capital are



















2.2 Thetrade-offbetween higher productivityand lowerdisasterlosses
Let us now assume that the amount of capital Kb can be either located in safe locations
(Ks) or in risky locations (Kr), with Kb = Ks + Kr. Examples of risky locations are
coastal areas, where storm surge and coastal ﬂoods are possible, as well as areas at risk
of river ﬂoods, high-concentration urban areas at risk of ﬂoods in case of heavy precipita-
tions, and hurricane-prone regions. We assume that risky locations are more productive,
thanks to their location (e.g., proximityfrom port infrastructure for export-oriented indus-
tries; coastline amenities for tourism; easier access to jobs in at-risk locations in crowded
cities). This increase in production has decreasing returns, however. As a consequence,
total production becomes:
Y = Yb +Δ Y = Yb + αK
γ
r (8)
where ΔY is the additional output produced thanks to the localization of capital in
risk-prone areas; α is a relative productivity advantage, and is assumed to grow at the
same rate than general productivity ψ (i.e., at the rate λ).
The capital located in the risky area can be affected by hazards, like ﬂoods and wind-
storms. If a hazard is too strong, it causes damages to the capital installed in at-risk areas,
and can be labeled as a disaster. To simplify the analysis, we assume that in that case, the
capital at-risk is totally destroyed. It is assumed that this is the only consequence of dis-
asters. Disaster fatalities and casualties are not considered in this simple model, assuming
that early warning, evacuation, emergency services, and higher quality housing and in-
frastructure can avoid them, which is consistent with the observation that disaster deaths
decrease with income, at least above a certain income level (Kahn, 2005; Kellenberg and
Mobarak, 2008).3 Moreover, additional indirect economic consequences (Hallegatte and
Przyluski, 2011, Strobl, 2011) are not taken into account.
These disasters (i.e. hazards that lead to capital destruction) have a probability p0 to
occur every year, except if protection investments are carried out and reduce this prob-
ability. These protection investments take many forms, depending on which hazard is
considered. Flood protections include dikes and seawalls, but also drainage systems to
cope with heavy precipitations in urban areas. Windstorm and earthquake protections
consist mainly in building retroﬁts and stricter building norms, to ensure old and new
buildings can resist stronger winds or larger earthquakes.
3Human losses could be taken into account if it is assumed that fatalities and casualties can be measured
by an equivalent economic loss, which is highly controversial; see a discussion in Viscusi and Aldy (2003).2.3 Optimal choice of p and Kr 6
It is assumed that better defenses reduce the probability of disasters, but do not reduce
their consequences. This is consistent with many types of defenses, like seawalls that
can protect an area up to a design standard of protection but fail totally if this standard is
exceeded.4 Better defenses are also more expensive, and the annual cost of defenses C










so that the cost of reducing the disaster probability to zero is inﬁnite. Depending on
the value of ν, protection costs increase more or less rapidly when the disaster probabil-
ity approaches zero. The parameter ν therefore corresponds to more or less optimistic
assumptions on protection costs.
Any given year, the economic output is given by:
Y = Yb + αK
γ
r − C(p) − L (10)
where Listhe damages fromdisasters, and is givenby a randomdraw withprobability
p. If a disaster occurs, losses are equal to Kr, i.e. all the capital located in the risky area
is destroyed. Any given year, the expected loss E(L) is equal to pKr and the expected
output is equal to:
E(Y )=Yb + αK
γ
r − C(p) − pKr (11)
2.3 Optimal choice of p and Kr
Assuming a social planner — or an equivalent decentralized decision-making process —
decides the amount of capital Kr to be located in the risky area and the level of protection
that is to be built, its program is:6
maxp,Kr E(Y )
s.t.Kr ≤ Kb and 0 ≤ p ≤ p0
(12)
We neglect risk aversion and we assume that the expected production is maximized,
not the expected utility. Doing so is acceptable if disaster losses remain small compared
4Also, the analysis with rational decision-makers is carried out assuming that there is no risk aversion.
In that case, reducing the probability of a disaster or the consequences in case of disaster is equivalent,
making this assumption irrelevant.
5The probabilityp here includes both the probabilitythat an event exceeds protectioncapacities, and the
defense failure probability, even for weaker events.
6This modelis differentfromthe modelof SchumacherandStrobl (2008). In thelatter, the onlydecision
concerns protection investments that mitigate disaster consequences, and there is no beneﬁt from taking
risks and thus no trade-off between safety and higher income.2.3 Optimal choice of p and Kr 7
with income, consistently with the Arrow-Lind theorem for public investment decisions
(Arrow and Lind, 1970). However, this condition holds only if disaster losses can be
pooled among a large enough population (e.g., a large country), and with many other
uncorrelated risks, i.e. in the presence of comprehensive insurance coverage or post-
disaster government support. In small countries (where a disaster can strike a large share
of the population), or where insurance, reinsurance, and post-disaster support are not
available, individual disaster losses can represent a large share of individual income and
savings, and the objective function needs to include risk aversion.











Assuming for now that Kr ≤ Kb and that p ≤ p0, the expected annual loss at the












When productivity α is growing over time at the rate λ, there are two possibilities,
dependingonthevalueofγ, theexponentrepresentingdecreasingreturnsintheadditional
productivity from capital located in at-risk areas (see Eq. (8)).
Proposition 2.1 If γ>ν / (ν+1), thenKr and E(L) are decreasing over time in absolute
terms. In that case, less and less capital is installed in the risky area when productivity
and wealth increase. So, the absolute level of risk is decreasing with wealth. It is also
noteworthy that, in such a situation, annual mean losses and capital at risk counter-
intuitively decrease if protection costs (ξ) increase. If γ<ν / (ν +1 ) , then the amount of
capital at-risk increases, and the risk (both in terms of average loss and maximum loss)
is increasing with wealth, and mean annual losses and capital at risk are augmented if
protection costs (ξ) increase.
But the absolute level of risk is not a good measure of risk: a wealthier society is able
to cope with larger losses. The question is therefore the relative change in risk. One way
of investigating this question is to assess whether Kr and E(L) are growing more or less
rapidly than Yb and Kb, i.e. at a rate larger or lower than μ.2.3 Optimal choice of p and Kr 8
If α is growing at a rate λ, expected losses E(L) are growing at a rate λ
−ν
γ+ν(γ−1)
and maximum losses (i.e., the losses in case a disaster occurs), Kr, are growing at a rate
λ
−(ν+1)
γ+ν(γ−1). Since K and Y are growing at a rate μ = λ/(1 − φ), we have the following
result:
Proposition 2.2 If φ ν
ν+1 <γ< ν
ν+1, then mean annual losses E(L) are growing faster
than baseline economic output Yb.I fφ − 1
ν+1 <γ< ν
ν+1, then the capital at risk and the
losses in case of disasters (i.e. Kr) are growing faster than Yb.
Withusualvaluesfor φ, i.e. about 1/3, andthe simplestassumptionfor protectioncost,
i.e. ν =1 , losses in case of disasters are growing faster than Y for any γ, positive and
lower than 1/2. Mean annual losses increase faster than Yb if γ is between 1/6 and 1/2.
Therefore, it is possible that disaster maximum losses and mean annual losses increase
with wealth in the future, even in relative terms.
In this case, all capital will eventually be installed in at-risk areas (Kr = Kb), and








Figure 1 summarizes these ﬁndings, for φ =1 /3. It shows four zones, as a function
of the values of the parameters ν and γ. In a signiﬁcant portion of the parameter space,
labeled “zone 2”, the capital at-risk and the mean annual losses increase, even in relative
terms when compared with total economic output. In this zone, therefore, disasters be-
come less and less frequent, but they are more and more destructive, in such a way that
the risk — i.e., the average losses — increases more rapidly than wealth and income.
Surprisingly, the increase in risk happens when γ is small enough, i.e. when addi-
tional productivity from locating capital in at-risk areas exhibits sufﬁciently diminishing
returns. Consistent with intuition, however, is the fact that increase in risk is more likely
when ν is large, i.e. when protection costs are increasing rapidly with the protection level.
It is interesting to note that absolute protection costs (ξ) and the absolute additional pro-
ductivity (α) do not inﬂuence the behavior of mean annual losses and capital at risk, but
only their levels.
If γ = ν/(ν +1 ) , there is no inside maximum in Eq. (12). Instead, there are two
possibilities depending on the protection cost relative to the additional productivity in
at-risk areas. If the additional productivity is high enough (relative to protection costs),
then all capital is located in at-risk area (Kr = Kb). If the additional production is not
sufﬁcient, then no protection is provided (p = p0).
The limit between these two possibilities depends on the protection costs, relative to
the additional productivity in at-risk areas. The limit protection cost (ξl) can be written as
a function of the additional productivity α as:2.3 Optimal choice of p and Kr 9


























Figure 1: Behaviors of the optimal mean annual losses (E(L)) and of the optimal capital
in at-risk areas (or, equivalently, of the losses in case of disaster) (Kr), as a function of
the values of the parameters γ and ν. There are four zones delimited by continuous lines.
In the ﬁrst zone, on the top of the ﬁgure, mean annual losses and capital at risk decrease
in absolute terms when the productivity increases. In the second one, the capital at risk
and the mean annual losses increase with productivity, both in absolute and relative terms
(with respect to to total output and productive capital). In the third zone, the capital at risk
still increases in absolute and relative terms, but the mean annual losses increase only in
absolute terms (they decrease in relative terms). In the fourth zone, at the bottom of the
ﬁgure, mean annual losses and capital at-risk increase in absolute terms but both decrease















Proposition 2.3 If γ = ν/(ν +1 )and ξ>ξ l(α) (or, equivalently, α<α l(ξ)), then




.I fγ = ν/(ν +1 )and ξ<ξ l(α) (or, equivalently, α>α l(ξ)), then all
capital is located in at-risk areas (Kr = Kb), and the protection is such that the disaster








In a reasonable framework and in a large parameter domain, a simple optimization sug-
gests that improved protection against frequent hazards can lead to increased exposure
to and losses from exceptional hazards. The consequence is that, as observed by ISDR
(2009), poor countries suffer mainly from frequent and low-cost events, while rich coun-
tries suffer from rare but catastrophic events. Our analysis also suggests that the overall
risk — i.e. mean annual losses — can increase with time, and that it can increase faster
than wealth, even if all decisions are based on rational trade-offs between income and
safety.
The model shows that the observed increase in disaster losses may not be due to
irrational behaviors and could be the result of rational decisions. If these assumptions
are correct, an increasingly wealthy world could see less disasters, but with increasingly
large consequences, resulting in average annual losses that keep increasing more rapidly
than income. Accounting for indirect disaster impact (see, e.g., Hallegatte and Przyluski,
2011, Strobl, 2011) or for changes in risk aversion with wealth may alter this conclusion
by augmenting disaster impacts in Eq. (11) or changing the objective function in Eq. (12).
3 Taking into account myopic behaviors and imperfect
information
This result assumes that both protection (i.e., p) and capital investment(i.e., Kr) decisions
are made rationally and with perfect knowledge of natural risks. This last assumption ap-
pears unrealistic, since many decisions are made using risk analysis based only on recent11
past experience, when risk is not simply disregarded (Magat et al., 1987; Camerer and
Kunreuther, 1989; and Hogarth and Kunreuther, 1995). This section proposes a modiﬁed
model to take into account this under-optimality in decision-making.
In this modiﬁed model, we assume that capital investment decisions are made with
imperfect knowledge, using risk assessments based on events of the recent past. This
assumption is consistent with the observation that most capital investment decisions are
notmadeusingallavailabledisasterriskinformation,andthatrisk-basedregulations(e.g.,
zoning policies) have had a limited impact on new developments in at-risk areas (on the
U.S. National Flood Insurance Program regulations, see for instance Burby, 2001).
On the other hand, we model protection decisions as made with perfect knowledge of
natural risks and assuming (wrongly) that capital investment decisions will then also be
made optimally and with perfect knowledge. There is thus an inconsistency in the model
between protectiondecisionsand capitalinvestmentdecisions. Thishypothesisisjustiﬁed
by thefact that (publicand private)protectiondecisionsare mostof timedesignedthrough
sophisticated risk analyses, taking into account all available information and assuming
optimal behaviors.
To assess the consequence of this myopic behavior, it is necessary to go beyond an-
alytical calculations, and use a numerical model. This model is extremely simple, and
based on the calculations from the previous section. The model has a yearly time step.
Each year, the baseline output Yb increases at the rate μ, and the additional productivity
α from at-risk capital increases at the rate λ. To decide on the optimal protection level,







Then, a decision is made on the amount of capital to install in at-risk areas. We
assume that this decision is made independently each year, with no inertia. It means that
the optimization can be done in a static manner, with no intertemporal optimization.
We assume decisions on the amount of capital to install in the risky area are based
on a disaster probability that is estimated empirically, not on the exact probability. To
do so, the model includes a random process, which decides — each year — whether
a disaster occurs. In practice, F(t)=1if there is a disaster during the year t, and
F(t)=0otherwise. The real disaster probability is p. The empirically estimated disaster








This modeling corresponds to backward-looking myopic expectation, in which past
events have an exponentiallydecreasing weight (with time scale τ). In other terms, agents
assess future disaster risks from past events, with a memory characteristic time τ. The
consequence is that the estimated disaster probability is higher than the real one just after
a disaster, and lower than the real one when no disaster has occurred for a while. This
behavior appears consistent with many observations (e.g., Kunreuther and Slovic, 1978;
Tol, 1998).
Investmentdecisions are based on this empirical probability, and the amount of capital








Just after a disaster, ˆ p(t) is larger than p(t), disaster risks are overestimated, the cap-
ital in the risky area is lower than its optimal value, and output is lower than its optimal
value. After a period without disaster, ˆ p(t) is lower than p(t), disaster risks are underes-
timated, the capital in the risky area is higher than its optimal value. As a consequence,
output is higher than its optimal value in absence of disaster, but losses are larger if a dis-
aster occurs. On the average, output is also lower than its optimal value, since additional
production thanks to higher productivity in risky areas does not compensate for larger
disaster losses.
The efﬁciency of this empirical process depends on the disaster probability. If there
are many disasters over a period τ (i.e. if 1/p< <τ ), the estimated probability remains
close to the real one. If the memory is too short, i.e. if τ is too low, then the estimated
probability will often be different from the real one.
This numerical model is created and simulated with ad hoc parameter values, as an
illustration of its results. Parameters are provided in Tab. 1; results are robust for different
choices for these parameters, except for γ, as shown in Section 2.3. In this numerical
exercise, we choose ν =1and select a value for γ such that mean annual losses increase
with wealth in relative terms, i.e. φ ν
ν+1 <γ< ν
ν+1 (the second zone in Fig. 1).
Results from one simulation are provided in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. Figure 2 shows the
real disaster probability p, which is decided through a perfect-information cost-beneﬁt
analysis (see Eq.(19)), and the estimated disaster probability ˆ p, which is assessed through
a myopic estimation (see Eq.(20)). After each disaster, the estimated disaster probability
is higher than the real one; when no disaster occurs for a long enough period of time, the
estimated disaster probability is below the real value.
Figure 3 shows in the upper panel the additional output thanks to the presence of
capital in the risky area (i.e. αKγ
r − C(p) − L, see Eq.(10)), with perfect information or
myopic behavior.7 It shows a production that depends on the amount of capital at risk:
7In this ﬁgure, the recovery and reconstruction are instantaneous, like in a world with inﬁnite recon-13
Name Description Value
Y (0) Initial production 10.
phi Capital decreasing return parameter 1/3
λ Growth in general productivity 2%
α0 Initial value of the additional productivity from capital in at-risk areas 0.4
γ Parameter describing the decreasing returns of investments in at-risk areas 0.2
p0 Disaster probability in absence of protections 0.8
ξ Parameter for absolute protection costs 0.035
ν Exponent in protection costs 1
τ Probability estimation memory timescale 5 years
Table 1: Parameters of the model.





































Real annual disaster probability
Estimated annual disaster probability
Figure 2: Real disaster probability p, decided through a perfect-information cost-beneﬁt
analysis (see Eq.(19)), and estimated disaster probability ˆ p, assessed through a myopic
adaptive reactive anticipation process, for one random realization.14
the larger the amount of capital, the larger the additional production. But when a disaster
occurs, this capital located in the risky area is wiped out, and this loss is recorded as an
output loss, i.e. through a drop in output. With myopic behavior, the amount of capital
at risk is too low when disaster probability is overestimated, and too high when this risk
is underestimated. When the risk is underestimated, additional output is larger than its
optimal value when no disaster occurs, but the drop in case of disaster is augmented, such
that the average output is lower. The bottom panel of Fig. 3 shows the total output, i.e. Y ,
with perfect information and myopic behavior. As a baseline, the output when no capital
is located in the risky area is also represented. The total output is higher than the baseline
output thanks to the location of capital at risk. When a disaster strikes, however, total
output is lower than the baseline.
In the myopic behavior case, at the end of the period, the productivity is high, and
the standard of protection is thus high. In other terms, the disaster probability is very low
thanks to good protection. In such a situation, disasters are rare and the estimated disaster
probability gets rapidly lower than the real one, prompting an over-investment in the at-
risk area. The consequence is a larger disaster with myopic behavior than with perfect
information.
So, adding myopic behaviors ampliﬁes our previous results. With perfect information,
thepopulationismoreprotectedwhenitgetsricher, thedisasterprobabilitydecreases over
time. But disasters become larger and larger when they occur. With myopic behavior, the
interval between two disasters rapidly becomes larger than the memory of the probability
estimation process, and there is over-investment in at-risk areas, making disasters more
catastrophic. There is thus a potential negative side-effect from higher protection, in
the form of an increased vulnerability to exceptional events that exceed the protection
capacity.
This trend toward larger disasters is even likely to be enhanced by other processes
inﬂuencing vulnerability, and especially indirect disaster impacts. In their industrial or-
ganization, businesses make trade-offs between their efﬁciency in normal conditions and
their resilience in case of unexpected shock (e.g., Henriet et al., 2012). For instance, there
is a tendency to reduce inventories and the number of suppliers to increase efﬁciency
and reduce costs. This strategy increases efﬁciency and reduces costs when all suppli-
ers are able to produce on demand. But in case of an exogenous shock, a disaster or the
bankruptcy of a supplier, reduced inventoriesand reliance on few suppliers can easily turn
into operational problems, as illustrated by the economic perturbations caused by the Ice-
landic volcano eruption in 2010 or the recent Tohoku-Paciﬁc earthquake in Japan. In the
same way, networks-shaped infrastructure (e.g., transportation or electricity infrastruc-
ture) can be designed with redundancy to increase robustness in case of disasters, but this
struction capacity. In reality, there are strong constraints on reconstruction, and it can take several years to
return to the pre-disaster situation; see, e.g., Hallegatte (2008).15







































































































Baseline with no capital at risk
Figure 3: In the upper panel, additional output thanks to the presence of capital in the
risky area (i.e. ΔY = αKγ
r −C(p)−L, see Eq.(10)), with perfect information or myopic
behavior. In the bottom panel, total output, i.e. Y ∗, with perfect information and myopic
behavior, and the baseline output when no capital is in at-risk locations.16
option make them more expensive in absence of disaster. In a situation in which disas-
ters are more and more exceptional, it is likely that businesses and other decision-makers
will focus even more on efﬁciency and less on disaster resilience. Such a trend would
increase the overall economic vulnerability, and would enlarge the welfare and economic
consequences of any disaster.
4 Policy implications
This paper proposes an economic framework to analyze the trade-off between disaster
losses and higher capital productivity in areas at risk from natural hazards. It suggests
that natural disasters become less frequent but more costly when productivity and wealth
increase. Current trends in disaster losses appear consistent with this prediction (e.g.,
Etkin, 1999; Nordhaus, 2010; Bouwer et al., 2007; Pielke et al., 2008; Bouwer, 2011).
These results are also in line with ISDR (2009), which observes that poor countries suffer
from frequent and low-cost events, while rich countries suffer from rare but high-cost
events. This trend is illustrated by the case of Japan. Thanks to strict building norms, the
country can cope with no damages with frequent earthquakes that would cause disasters
in any other place of the world. But this resilience allows for higher investments in at-
risk areas, and exceptional quakes like the recent Tohoku Paciﬁc earthquake can then lead
to immense losses. There is thus a potential negative side-effect from higher protection
against disaster, in the form of an increasing vulnerability to exceptional events.
In some cases, this negative side-effect leads to an increase in risk level, in spite of
continuouslyimprovingprotection. Indeed, the model suggests that the overall risk — i.e.
mean annual losses — can increase with time in spite of a decreasing disaster probabil-
ity. The risk can even increase faster than wealth in some circumstances. A consequence
of these ﬁndings is that future increase in disaster losses might be difﬁcult to avoid. In-
creasing losses may even be desirable from an economic point-of-view, provided that (i)
human losses can be avoided (thanks to warning and evacuation); (ii) affected populations
are supported in disaster aftermaths or have access to insurance, to make sure individual
losses remain small and the conditions of the Arrow-Lind theorem are respected (i.e., risk
aversion can be neglected). This paper suggests a strong and increasing need for post-
disaster support, through insurance, ad hoc support, emergency and crisis-management
arrangements, in addition to investments in disaster protections, hazard forecasts, and
early warning.
Not all risks are linked to rational choices, however. We showed that imperfect in-
formation and myopic expectations can amplify risk-taking behaviors. This effect can
be reinforced by other sub-optimalities. In particular, some economic agents have little
ﬂexibility in their localization choices, like the poorest households who locate in informal
settlements in developing-country cities. Also, risk involves externalities: when many17
buildings are destroyed by an earthquake, the economic system is paralyzed and collec-
tive losses exceed the sum of initial private losses (Lall and Deichmann, 2010; Henriet
et al., 2011). These risk ampliﬁcation mechanisms and externalities may lead economic
agents to accept more risk than what is socially optimal. These important sub-optimalities
provide ample justiﬁcation for public action to manage risks and limit risk-taking behav-
iors. But our results suggest that this action should not systematically aim at reducing
the level of risk. Instead, it should aim at managing the level of risk, to limit disaster
losses while making sure that we can still take the worthwhile risks that yield large bene-
ﬁts. In other terms, disaster risk management policies should be favored over disaster risk
reduction policies.
Disaster risk management policies need to acknowledge the beneﬁts from investing
in at-risk areas, and take these beneﬁts into account in their design. If individuals and
businesses take risks that are inappropriate at the social scale, the best course of action
is different depending on what explains this behavior. If it is due to irrational behaviors
and imperfect information only, then communication tools and land-use regulations are
easy to implement and should be able to reduce the level of risk. But if this behavior
is also justiﬁed by the beneﬁts derived from investing and settling in at-risk areas, then
efﬁcient risk management policies will fail or be economically detrimental if they do not
provide alternatives to get similar beneﬁts without taking those risks. If investment in
risky coastal areas are explained by the beneﬁts from the proximity of a port, for instance,
then risk can be reduced by providing businesses with safe development areas that are
connected to the port by efﬁcient transport infrastructure. And when activities require
proximity to the port and no alternative exists, then investment should be allowed in at-
risk areas, provided that a) social beneﬁts justify it, and b) speciﬁc risk mitigation actions
are undertaken (from warning and evacuation systems to compulsory insurance with risk-
based premium). Similarly, if newcomers settle in risky areas of mega-cities because it
is the only way to have access to the jobs and opportunities offered by the city, then risk
cannot be reduced by simply prohibiting settlements in these areas. Such a policy would
face strongpoliticaloppositionand, if implemented,mightlead tothe creation of informal
settlements, thereby increasing the level of risk instead of reducing it. An efﬁcient policy
should rather propose viable alternatives to newcomers, for instance by providing cheap
and rapid (possibly subsidized) public transportation from job centers to safe areas that
can be developed.
The typical approach for risk mitigation is based on “ﬂood zoning,” i.e. on the deﬁni-
tion of ﬂood-prone areas where investment and settlement are prohibited. This approach,
however, faces difﬁculties in implementation and enforcement, because it neither distin-
guishes among different types of economic activities nor accounts for potential beneﬁts
from at-risk investments. A more ﬂexible approach that accounts for these beneﬁts —
through economic analysis or consultative processes — is more likely to be effective in18
reducing risks and to provide net economic beneﬁts. More generally, disaster risk man-
agement policies need to shift from a purely negative stance — indicating where it is
prohibited to invest and settle — to a more positive approach — indicating where invest-
ments should be directed, and providing complementary measures that can make these
investments as beneﬁcial as those is at-risk areas. To do so, risk management should not
focus only on at-risk areas, but follow a more holistic approach, integrated in develop-
ment planning. Sometimes, building a transportation infrastructure to connect job centers
to safe housing areas is more efﬁcient to reduce risk levels than building dikes to protect
a ﬂood-prone zone.
These results also have consequences on climate change policies. First, they show that
economic growth has no theoretical reason to automatically reduce disaster losses, even
in relative terms. And if empirical results suggest that growth and development lower the
number of deaths from disasters (Kahn, 2005), at least above a certain level of income, the
evidence concerning their impact on disaster economic losses is mixed and inconclusive.
Itimpliesthatreducingdisastereconomiclossesrequiresaspeciﬁc, targetedpolicyaction.
Moreover, it is likely that socio-economic drivers will remain the dominant drivers of
future changes in disaster losses. Some have derived from this result the idea that policy-
makers should focus on reducing trends in disaster exposure and vulnerability,not on mit-
igating climate change (e.g., Pielke et al., 2005). But if socio-economic drivers of losses
are the consequence of a desirable trade-off and yield signiﬁcant beneﬁts, as suggested
here, it might not be rational to oppose them in a systematic way. Anthropogenic climate
change may increase disaster losses without providing any beneﬁts in return. When com-
paring two drivers of disaster losses, the question should not be to identify which one is
responsible for the larger increase in losses, but which one is the most cost-effective lever
to reduce losses. The possibility of increasing disaster losses not driven by settlement in
risky areas for economic beneﬁt but by anthropogenic climate change are therefore likely
to represent a powerful incentive to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.
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